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Abstract 
Popularity of Online Social Networks has been recently overshadowed by the privacy problems 
they pose. Users are getting increasingly vigilant concerning information they disclose and are 
strongly opposing the use of their information for commercial purposes. Nevertheless, as long as 
the network is offered to users for free, providers have little choice but to generate revenue 
through personalized advertising to remain financially viable. Our study empirically investigates 
the ways out of this deadlock. Using conjoint analysis we find that privacy is indeed important for 
users. We identify three groups of users with different utility patterns: Unconcerned Socializers, 
Control-conscious Socializers and Privacy-concerned. Our results provide relevant insights into 
how network providers can capitalize on different user preferences by specifically addressing the 
needs of distinct groups in the form of various premium accounts. Overall, our study is the first 
attempt to assess the value of privacy in monetary terms in this context.  
Keywords:  Online Social Networks, Web 2.0, Value of Privacy, Conjoint Analysis, Cluster Analysis 
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Introduction 
Online Social Networks (OSNs) such as Facebook or StudiVZ represent popular Internet platforms that connect 
people around the globe. More than 250 million people are currently actively using Facebook with an average 
member having 120 friends (Facebook 2009). The value of OSNs lies in facilitating communication between users. 
By offering new easy ways to maintain relationships with offline contacts, OSNs may represent a key to solving the 
“bowling alone” problem, which manifests itself in increased disconnectedness and isolation of individuals in 
modern societies (Putman 2000). Indeed, OSNs allow individuals to support connection to other people, even if they 
are physically remote. This helps to create social capital, which can be viewed as a direct contribution of OSNs to 
public value (Ellison et al. 2007).   
Despite their ability to create value, OSNs are often criticized for the privacy risks they involve. OSN providers, in 
particular, are often placed in the centre of this critique due to their questionable practices of using member 
information for commercial purposes (e.g. Schonfeld 2007). Many users regard personalized advertising as a 
privacy breach and express their privacy concerns in numerous OSN groups and personal blogs (Blakely 2007; 
Lischka 2007). More than one third of the articles in the review of German media by Rizk et al. (2009) related 
privacy violations to personalized advertising and behavior targeting - practices often traced back to OSN provider.  
Addressing this set of concerns, it is important to note, however, that using information provided by users for 
marketing purposes may represent an important source to finance operations of OSNs, which are currently offered to 
users for free. This is because providing OSN service is costly. For example, StudiVZ (2009a), a popular German 
OSN, expands on the effort it takes to support the network: “Our servers ensure that the data is available to you at 
the speed of 5.400 MBit per second during the peak times. As a comparison: a regular DSL-connection reaches 16 
MBit/s. So, we are 338 times “faster” (translated from German by the authors). As a result, many OSN providers 
will have little choice but to generate revenue through advertising in order to remain financially viable as long as the 
network is offered for free. Moreover, taking into account the low attention users pay at online advertising, 
personalization of banners might be the only real possibility to ensure sufficient money influx (Sachoff 2008). 
Therefore, even though a growing number of privacy abuse accusations are detrimental to OSN image, most of the 
criticized practices will persist if the business model of OSNs remains unchanged.  
Despite the fact that users enjoy using their OSNs for free, OSN providers find it difficult to avoid critique from 
multiple stakeholders whenever they try to directly profit from their main asset - user information. For example, an 
attempt of StudiVZ to change their general terms and conditions in order to gain more rights with respect to using 
member data has triggered an outburst of discussions in the media. As a result, many users faked their profiles and 
some have even left the network. Similarly, Facebook has attempted to profit on social recommendations for 
consumer products by launching the Beacon application. Its introduction has resulted in an immense public outrage 
blaming Facebook for trying to misuse sensitive user data. History of these public failures transmits an important 
message to OSN providers: attempts to recklessly generate revenue without accounting for user privacy concerns 
can seriously undermine platform self-sustainability and result in a serious public backlash. 
This type of dynamics places OSN provider in front of a problem, which is hard to solve. Moreover, users are 
getting increasingly vigilant with regard to their OSN activities as a consequence of perceived privacy threats (e.g. 
Krasnova et al. 2009). Despite their concerns, users have, however, only one “take-it-or-leave-it” option when 
joining an OSN. Even if they are not comfortable with the terms and conditions, e.g. use of their information or 
availability of privacy controls, users have no choice but to comply or stay out of the game. Being continuously 
dissatisfied with the way their privacy concerns are addressed, OSN users may choose to restrict their networking 
activities – an outcome in which all participating parties will lose. Moreover, public value of OSNs, expressed in 
their ability to create social capital, can be endangered.  
Bringing both sides of the argument together, one can see that both parties - OSN providers and OSN users - find 
themselves as prisoners in a deadlock situation. On the one hand, users resent questionable information handling 
procedures, on the other hand OSN providers are left with no option, but to use some of member information to 
generate revenue, as long as the network is offered for free. This situation, however, can be changed. For example, 
business online networks such as Xing are already offering premium accounts, where no advertisements are 
displayed, users have a possibility to send more secure messages to other members and are offered more control 
over who visits their profiles (Xing 2009). Indeed, offering users to pay for their privacy may represent a viable 
solution out of the existing impasse.  
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This leads us to the following questions: Will OSN users be ready to pay for their privacy on the platform? And if 
so, how much? Are users ready to trade off some of their privacy in exchange for other incentives? To what extent 
and why do users differ in their privacy valuations? Finding answers to these questions will allow OSN providers to 
decide whether introducing premium “privacy-friendly” accounts constitutes a viable alternative to the current 
business model.  
To address these research questions, we employ conjoint methodology, which is an accepted approach to measure 
consumer preferences in the light of the existing trade-offs. In fact, in a real situation users might be ready to trade 
their privacy for other benefits (Hui et al. 2006). This way a real privacy valuation can be derived. In the context of 
our study, we identify five variables playing a role in a user decision to choose an OSN: price, network popularity, 
profile customizability, availability of privacy controls and level of information use by the OSN provider. We then 
determine the importance of these variables in a user decision to join an OSN. In the next step, we employ 
hierarchical cluster analysis to segment OSN users into 3 groups in order to better understand how distinct segments 
of OSN users can be addressed (e.g. when designing a structure of premium accounts). Taken together, our study 
provides important insights on the real value of privacy on OSNs as well as gives valuable recommendations for 
OSN providers who can then create a more sophisticated revenue model by simultaneously addressing user privacy 
needs. 
Related Work 
Boyd and Ellison (2007) define OSNs as web-based services that allow individuals to create a profile and connect to 
friends within a bounded system. Hogben (2007) mentions development of the sense of connectedness and intimacy 
as an important benefit OSNs provide. In addition, OSNs enable users to control the impression they produce on 
others by allowing them to decide how much they are willing to self-disclose as well as by offering privacy settings 
to strategically manage access to personal information. On the negative side, privacy risks and resulting concerns are 
often mentioned as impediments to user participation and self-disclosure on OSNs (Krasnova et al. 2009). 
Research provides multiple insights on the factors underlying the process of the formation of individual privacy 
preferences. From an organizational standpoint, violation of distributive justice principles reflecting the “fairness of 
the outcome that they [users] receive from online companies in return for releasing their personal information” 
(Son and Kim 2008, p. 510) can negatively impact users’ feelings related to privacy loss (e.g. Culnan and Bies 
2003). In addition, such environmental facts as trust in legal assurances may ultimately be correlated with individual 
privacy concerns (Krasnova and Veltri 2010). Personal experiences and individual predispositions may play a role 
as well. For example, Metzger (2004) argue that past levels of self-disclosure are predictive for future behavior. 
Furthermore, personal attitudes towards advertising and personalization (Phelps et al. 2001), general privacy 
attitudes (Joinson et al. 2006) as well as user trusting beliefs (e.g. Jarvenpaa and Tractinsky 1999) may influence the 
way people perceive risks related to a particular technology. Finally, demographic characteristics such as age and 
gender may determine individual privacy valuation (Sheehan 1999).  
Typically, Privacy Calculus paradigm (Dinev and Hart, 2006) is used to explain the dynamics underlying user 
participation in the light of privacy concerns. This theory argues that when making a decision, individuals are 
consciously weighting costs (e.g. giving up privacy) and benefits (e.g. social connection (Joinson 2008) of their 
actions. Hence, users face certain trade-offs. What choice users make depends on their preferences. Privacy Calculus 
approach has been frequently applied using the Structural Equation Modeling methodology, where the model is 
assessed on the basis of the answers collected in a survey (e.g. Dinev and Hart 2006). However, Harper and 
Singleton (2001, p.1) argue that “It costs a consumer nothing to express a desire for a law to protect privacy”. 
Consequently, survey instruments cannot help answer the question how much people will be ready to pay for their 
privacy in a real-life situation. These drawbacks of traditional surveys can be addressed by using conjoint analysis, 
which allows approximating consumer responses to a real-life setting with its inherent trade-offs.  
Several researchers have already used conjoint analysis to study individual privacy valuation and its antecedents. 
Investigating consumer privacy concerns when information is collected by a marketer, Phelps et al. (2001) find that 
consumers’ purchase decisions are determined by privacy concerns, which are, in turn, influenced by attitudes 
toward direct marketing and consumer desire for control over their personal information. In the next step, Hann et al. 
(2002) explore the trade-offs between three types of privacy concerns (errors, improper access and secondary use) 
and two types of benefits (monetary rewards and time savings) online consumers face when visiting a website. They 
confirm the presence of privacy calculus in individual decisions showing that users are willing to give up some of 
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their privacy for economic incentives. Extending that study, Hann et al. (2007) discover several clusters of users 
with similar utility patterns: privacy guardians, information sellers, and convenience seekers. The authors argue that 
companies have the means to address privacy concerns of their online consumers. Whereas offers of privacy 
protection against various types of privacy abuse are related to positive valences, they are capitalizable. This 
conclusion is important in the context of our study as OSN providers are currently looking for ways to mitigate user 
concerns as well as to ensure their financial survival.  
Overall, insights into privacy preferences of OSN users are still sparse and are mainly derived on the basis of 
surveys involving Likert or similar scales, responses to which may be biased. Trying to fill this gap, we apply 
conjoint approach to understand the valuation of privacy by OSN users. This approach will help us to understand 
what choices users would make when facing different trade-offs, including privacy-related decisions. Overall, the 
use of conjoint analysis will help us to disentangle the existing puzzle on how the two opposing perspectives of OSN 
providers and OSN users can be reconciled.  
Research Framework 
In a conjoint analysis, it is assumed that consumers view products as a bundle of certain characteristics (attributes), 
which can take the form of different values (levels). For example, if “information use by OSN provider” constitutes 
an attribute of an OSN, the respective levels will be the different degrees of to what extent this information can be 
used (Orme 2002a). Conjoint analysis allows researchers to make inferences about the underlying value system 
(Johnson 1974) by allowing to decompose the overall utilities of the different stimuli consumers are asked to 
evaluate (in our case variations of OSNs). This way the relative importance of product attributes can be evaluated. 
Pre-study: Interview Phase 
To determine the attributes and their levels, we first analyzed the literature dealing with OSN participation and 
privacy trade-offs as described above. In the next step, as suggested by Green and Krieger (1991), we conducted 
multiple in-depth semi-structured interviews with OSN users in order to determine the main drivers of utility of 
OSNs1. This intermediate step helped us to reduce the danger of model misspecification since in Conjoint Analysis 
it is essential that no attribute driving users’ utility is omitted from the analysis (Hair et al. 1995).  
Interview participants singled out presence of friends (network popularity) and profile customizability as the key 
factors underlying OSN utility. These findings are in line with Boyd (2007, p.11) who notes that user behavior in 
OSNs is to a large extent determined by the desire to communicate and self-present: “Through profiles, teens can 
express salient aspects of their identity for others to see and interpret”. While presence of one’s friends satisfies the 
desire to communicate, profile customizability helps to self-express and self-present. Further, respondents 
mentioned privacy-related factors, such as availability of privacy controls as well as practices of the OSN provider 
with respect to their information (Information Use by OSN Provider) as important for their network use. These 
findings are in line with previous research results which show that users consider available privacy controls as 
insufficient (Boyd 2008) or too complex (Strater and Richter 2007) as well as resent misuse of their information by 
OSN provider (Rizk et al. 2009). These four factors were included as attributes into our model. In addition, in line 
with the purpose of our study, another attribute – price – has been integrated. Overall, these five attributes, price, 
network popularity, customizability, information use by OSN Provider and privacy control, have been considered. 
Note that this meets the recommendation by Green and Srinivasan (1990) that the number of attributes should be 
limited to at most 6. 
The interviews also helped us to find appropriate levels for these five attributes.  For example, we found that the fee 
of 10 Euro per month is unacceptable in the OSN context. A price of 6 Euro, similar to the one charged by Business 
Online Networks (e.g. Xing), has been mentioned as realistic. Further, when talking about the use of information by 
the OSN provider, respondents differentiated between the use of their demographic data and all information they 
provide. In addition, the levels for network popularity were chosen in line with Liehr (2005).  
                                                          
1
 Sample description of the interviewees and detailed discussion of the results of the interviews go beyond the scope of this paper and are 
available from the authors upon request. 
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Conjoint Design 
Before starting the conjoint part of the survey, participants were provided with a set of instructions. Since we aimed 
to understand participants’ choices independent of their current OSN membership we asked them to imagine that: 
(1) they were not a member of any OSN yet, (2) they were in the process of choosing a network that suited their 
preferences best and (3) they planned to sign in to the chosen network under their real name. At the next step, 
participants were instructed that OSNs could differ in five attributes, which were then presented together with their 
respective levels. Intuitive names were chosen for each level to ease understanding during the conjoint phase. 
Table 1 shows how the attributes and their respective levels were presented to the survey participants. These 
instructions were carefully pretested to ensure that respondents correctly remembered and interpreted each level.   
Table 1. Explanation of Attributes and Levels 
Attribute Name Explanation of the Attributes and Levels given to Study Participants 
Price 
For now, almost all Social Networks are free, even though their maintenance is expensive. Their 
existence is often supported through online advertising (banners). In our scenarios, you can be 
required to pay for the OSN membership. The following levels of price are available: Free: 0 
Euro per month; 3 Euros per month; 6 Euros per month. 
Network 
Popularity 
Some networks are big; others are rather small and specialized. In our scenarios, the OSN can 
have the following popularity among your friends and acquaintances: 25%; 50% or 75% of 
your friends/acquaintances are on the OSN. 
Customizability 
OSNs may differ in the extent to which you can customize your profile (e.g. change page 
wallpaper, colors, fonts, and layout; add applications, favorite music, videos). In our scenarios, 
you have the following levels of customizability:  
• Low Customizability: The OSN offers little possibilities to distinguish your profile from 
others. You can only enter your personal information into the pre-designated fields. All 
profiles look more or less the same. Example: StudiVZ 
• Medium Customizability: You can customize your profile in terms of the look (wallpaper, 
text color, fonts) and applications, but the basic layout structure stays the same for 
everybody.  
• High Customizability: The OSN offers you many possibilities to create a visually unique 
profile. You are given a great flexibility in how the page can be structured (layout, 
wallpaper, font). Your profile is unique! Example: MySpace. 
Privacy Control 
OSNs may differ in the degree of privacy control options given to you. Privacy control options 
allow you to define who can access your information (profile, wall, photos, etc.). In our 
scenarios, you have the following choices: 
• “ALL-OR-FRIENDS-ONLY”: In this scenario you are given one basic option: you can 
choose to show the profile to ALL users in the network OR to FRIENDS ONLY. 
• “GROUP-BY-GROUP”: In addition to the ALL-OR-FRIENDS-ONLY level, you can 
classify friends into groups of your own choice and specify which PARTS of your profile 
(e.g. photos, Wall) the different groups can or cannot see. Example: You may create a 
group called “Colleagues” which will not have access to all your pictures. 
• “FRIEND-BY-FRIEND”: In addition to ALL-OR-FRIENDS-ONLY and GROUP-BY-
GROUP options, one can specify which ELEMENTS of your profile PARTS (a single 
photo in a photo-album) a particular FRIEND can or cannot see. Example: You have some 
party photos and would like friend X not to see two pictures from this particular party 
album. In this scenario you may forbid friend X access to these two pictures. Friend X will 
not know he does not have access to it. 
Information Use 
by OSN 
Provider 
Maintaining an OSN has its price. To finance itself, the OSN Provider may use some of the 
information you provide to display personalized advertising to you (e.g. banners). 
Generally, your information could be divided into two groups: Demographics Information 
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(age, gender, city, study major) and Personal Information (work, hobbies, personal interests, 
religion, political orientation, groups, relationship status, sexual orientation, photos, videos). In 
our scenarios, you have the following choices:   
• “NO INFORMATION IS USED”: None of your Information is used. 
• “ONLY DEMOGRAPHICS IS USED”: Only your Demographic Information is used by 
the SN provider to personalize advertising displayed to you. Example: Women will be 
shown the advertising of the lipstick, whereas men the advertising of the new shaving gel. 
• “ALL INFO IS USED”: Your Demographic and Personal Information can be used by the 
OSN Provider to personalize advertising displayed to you. Example: Single men under 35 
living in Stuttgart will be shown the advertising of a popular city club. 
Survey Design: Complementary Part 
Conjoint analysis is typically followed by a cluster analysis that aims to segment people into groups with similar 
utility patterns. In order to be able to better understand the factors underlying these differences in valuation across 
the resulting segments, we also asked respondents to provide their demographic information (e.g. sex) in a 
complimentary survey part. In addition, respondents were asked a set of questions measuring several constructs (see 
Table 2), which emerged as important determinants of individual privacy concerns, as outlined in the ‘Related 
Work’ section. We relied on existing operationalization where possible. However, many items had to be modified to 
fit OSN specifics. Most items were anchored on a 7-point Likert scale (1=Strongly Disagree; 7=Strongly Agree)2.  
Table 2. Examples of Construct Operationalization  
Construct No of items Example of Items  
Participation 3 1. I regularly log in on my OSN; 2. Using Social Network is part of my daily 
routine; (based on Ellison et al. 2006). 
Amount of Self-
Disclosure 4 
1. I have a detailed profile on the Social Network I use; 2. My profile tells a lot 
about me; (based on Krasnova et al. 2009). 
Legal Trust 3 
1. I feel confident that existing laws protect me against abuse of my information 
online; 2. Existing laws adequately protect my information online; (based on 
McKnight et al. 2002). 
Trust in online 
companies 4 
Generally, online companies: 1. …are honest with users when it comes to using 
their information; 2. …are trustworthy in handling the information users provide; 
(based on Malhotra et al. 2004). 
Distributive Justice 3 
1. I find it fair that some of the information I provide can be used for personalized 
advertising in exchange for free social networking services; 2. The benefits I 
receive from OSN are attractive enough to let OSN provider use some of my 
information for marketing purposes. (self-developed) 
Attention for Online 
Advertising 3 
1. I don’t pay attention to banners displayed on the websites; 2. I don't notice the 
banners when I am surfing on the Internet. (Reversed) (self-developed) 
Attitude Personal. 
Advertising 4 
How would you feel if online advertisings (e.g. banners) displayed to you on an 
OSN: 1…were adapted to your tastes; 2…were related to things of interest to you. 
(based on Chellappa and Sin 2005) (1=Very Bad; 7=Very Good) 
Past Experience 3 How often have you felt in the past: 1. …that your privacy was invaded online? (based on Smith et al. 1996) (1=Never; 4=Sometimes; 7=Very Often) 
Privacy Attitude  3 Privacy Segmentation Questions from Harris Interactive (2003) 
                                                          
2
 Complete list of items is available from the authors upon request. 
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Study Realization 
There are several ways in how conjoint analysis can be conducted. When applying the traditional full-profile 
approach, researchers provide respondents with a set of stimuli which they have to rank or rate (e.g. Hann et al. 
2002, 2007). Despite the fact that this approach is wide-spread, it represents a very high cognitive challenge to the 
respondents (Green and Srinivasan 1978) even when used in its reduced form (fractional factorial design). We tested 
the applicability of this approach by offering 20 students to rate 16 cards each with one stimulus (obtained from an 
orthogonal design of our 3 x 3 x 3 x 3 x 3=243 stimuli). We noticed that many students were struggling with the 
answers. Moreover, participants tended to dichotomize their responses, mainly concentrating on the ‘price’ attribute 
(free vs. not free). As a result, many responses were difficult to interpret and mostly unusable.  
To avoid these problems, we decided to use computer-aided Adaptive Conjoint Analysis (ACA), which is a variant 
of the hybrid conjoint analysis implemented in the Conjoint Extension of the Globalpark Survey Suit (Globalpark 
2008). A specific feature of the Adaptive Conjoint Analysis is that for each respondent, the consecutive answers are 
taken into account and immediately used for a further development of the personalized questionnaire. As a result, 
mental load of the respondents, needed to determine the importance of attributes and attribute levels, is significantly 
reduced (Srinivasan 1997). Due to the methodology of the ACA, participants had to answer all questions which were 
asked. Following Johnson (1987) and Green et al. (1991), our ACA consisted of four phases. The first phase 
involved rating of the attributes. From these responses, best and worst levels were obtained for each attribute and for 
each respondent. In the second phase, respondents were asked to determine the importance of the difference between 
the best and worst levels for each attribute. For example the following question was asked: If two Online Social 
Networks only differed in the level of Monthly Fee, how important would the difference of ‘Free’ vs. ‘6 Euro’ be to 
you (1=Not Important at All; 7=Very Important)? In the third phase, respondents had to do 12 pair-wise 
comparisons: they had to specify on a bipolar seven-point scale (1=Strongly Prefer OSN1; 7=Strongly Prefer 
OSN2), which of two OSNs presented to them they preferred. In the fourth phase (“calibration phase”), the 
participants were given five examples of Online Social Networks and for each of them had to indicate on a scale 
from 0 to 100 how much they were likely to join. The calibration phase is important since it allows assessing how 
attentive participants were when filling in the questionnaire. A negative or very small correlation between final 
utilities and calibrated utilities indicates that the respondent was inattentive to the questionnaire and / or responded 
inconsistently.  
Analysis of Empirical Results   
Sampling 
Invitations to participate in the study were distributed via multiple mailing lists in numerous universities. The 
responses were collected from January until March 2009. About 50 % of the participants received a 5-Euro gift 
certificate in exchange for their participation. The overall gross sample consisted of 214 observations. After deleting 
43 incomplete observations and 3 observations with low correlation between final and calibrated utilities, a final net 
sample had 168 observations. Being a current OSN member was not a precondition for this study. In total, however, 
69% (19%) of the respondents stated that they used Facebook (StudiVZ) as their main OSN. Only 3 participants 
were not members of any network. The sample consisted to 60.7% of women. The majority of the respondents were 
either students or had a university degree. 85.7% (respectively 10.1%) were between 20 and 29 (respectively 
between 30 and 39) years old. 26.2%, 39.9%, 6.0% and 3.0% were coming from France, Germany, Russia and the 
United Kingdom, respectively. 17.3%, 72.6% and 10.1% belonged to Privacy Fundamentalists, Pragmatists and 
Unconcerned groups, respectively, according to the privacy segmentation by Harris Interactive (2003).  
Analysis Structure 
The analysis of the study results involved several stages. First, using conjoint analysis, the relative importances of 
our five attributes as well as final utilities (part-worths), reflecting the attractiveness of a specific attribute level, 
were derived. The relative importances allowed us to draw conclusions about the role each attribute plays in a user’s 
decision to join the network. Part-worths were used to estimate the utility change between attribute levels and gave 
insights about the trade-offs users might consider. Further, Euro-values for each change in the attribute levels were 
derived, which gives OSN providers initial insights on how user preferences for certain attribute levels can be 
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translated into monetary value. While the first part of our analysis gave us an “average” picture of the way various 
attributes and their levels are valued by OSN users, in the second step we acknowledged that there may be 
systematic differences between various user sub-groups within our sample. As a result, 3 groups of people with 
similar utility patterns were derived with the help of a cluster analysis of the final utilities. We then analyzed the 
distinctive characteristics of these clusters by looking at the differences between the relative importances of various 
attributes, the utility change values as well as the Euro-values of level changes.  
Analysis of Conjoint Results 
Table 3 presents the results of the conjoint analysis: the average relative importance of the different attributes as 
well as the average mean final utilities (part-worths)3 of the corresponding levels for the overall sample. Column 
“Utility change” of Table 4 depicts the average change in final utility if the network switches from one level of an 
attribute to another one. Column “P-value on equality” of Table 4 shows the P-value on the t-test conducted on the 
null hypothesis that the two levels provide the same utility for the users (equal average part-worths). Relative 
importances were calculated on the basis of the part-worths. In accordance with Orme (2002b) we averaged 
individual relative importances for respondents for the overall sample, rather than computing importances from 
averaged utilities. Relative importances help us to understand the ranking of the attributes when it comes to the 
choice of an OSN. 
Studying the results, note that if we consider the different attributes independently from each other, all final utilities 
have the expected relations. Looking at the highest part-worth for each attribute we can derive the ideal OSN from 
the user point of view: it is free, includes 75% of one’s friends (the more the better), allows to restrict accessibility 
on the friend-by-friend basis, no user information is used and customizability is either medium or high.  
With a relative importance of 31.1%, price is the most important factor in the choice of an OSN. The P-values of the 
tests on equality of part-worths indicate that all price levels provide significantly different utilities. We observe that 
utility decrease is bigger for a change of price from “free” to “3 Euros” than from “3 Euros” to “6 Euros” (see 
Table 4). This indicates a particular aversion to a shift from a free network to a paid one. Network popularity is the 
second most important variable: the relative importance constitutes 24.7%. We find that utility is increasing in 
network size, yet a change from “25%” to “50%” is more valuable than from “50%” to “75%”, which may hint at 
decreasing marginal utility of network popularity. Our results demonstrate how much value users attach to this 
attribute. Imagine two competing networks: one with 75% and one with 25% in popularity with other things being 
equal.  The more popular network could increase its price from € 0 to € 3 Euro for its service (absolute utility drop 
of 2.107) without being afraid to immediately lose its user base, as the absolute drop in utility when switching to the 
less popular network (75% to 25% in popularity) would still be higher (1.665 + 1.344 = 3.009). Information Use by 
OSN Provider plays an important role, too: The relative importance of this attribute amounts to 18.7%, so that this 
criterion is the third most important factor, even outpacing customizability and privacy control. This finding refutes 
the common notion that OSN users do not care about their privacy, which is in line with Krasnova et al. (2009) 
findings who confirm a link between privacy concerns and resulting behavior. As expected, utility is higher the less 
information is used (see Table 3). Note that the utility decrease from “no information used” to “demographic data 
used” is far less pronounced than that from “demographic information used” to “all information used”, showing that 
OSN users are particularly alerted if a network uses all their personal information. A closer look at our results shows 
that users are almost indifferent between (1) paying for the OSN if it increases its price from € 0 to € 3 and does not 
use their information (absolute utility drop of 2.107) and (2) paying nothing but letting the OSN provider use all 
their information instead of no information (-0.829 + -1.468 = -2.297 ≈ -2.107) with all other things being equal. 
This is an important finding, as it shows that, contrary to the popular claims that “OSNs should be for free” or that 
“privacy is priceless”, there exists a distinct market for privacy. This finding is in line with Hann et al. (2002), who 
also shows that users are ready to sacrifice some of their privacy for monetary benefits. With 13.9%, privacy control 
has a rather low relative importance. This finding may be indicative for the low perceived effectiveness of privacy 
controls in protecting published information against many types of abuse. Indeed, regardless of the chosen privacy 
setting, OSN providers still have access to user data. Moreover, approved contacts can also make published 
information available to unauthorized others. Nevertheless, more control is perceived as better by the users. This is 
                                                          
3
 Note that in our Adaptive Conjoint Analysis we used “effects coding”, which means that utilities are scaled to sum to 0 within each attribute. 
Consequently, it is not appropriate to test whether the average final utilities are statistically different from 0 and, therefore, we do not provide P-
values on this test. 
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in line with Phelps et al. (2001), who show that consumers’ desire for control over their personal information is an 
important factor in reducing privacy concerns. Thus, users are not afraid of complexity with regard to privacy 
settings and are ready to take effort to deal with intricate privacy design in exchange for more refined access 
controls. Finally, customizability also has a low relative importance (11.5%). Here, it is noteworthy that users almost 
do not perceive any difference between “medium customizability” and “high customizability” (the corresponding P-
value equals 0.637, Table 4). In line with this finding, Facebook does not have to invest more into a more flexible 
profile design. In fact, it offers optimal page customizability (medium), by allowing users to always keep their 
profiles different (by posting comments, photos, website links on the Wall), but within a specified standard structure 
(basic layout).  
Table 3. Attributes, Levels, Relative Importances and Final Utilities 
Attributes Levels Final Utilities (Part-Worths) 
Standard 
Errors 
Relative 
Importances 
Free 1.981 0.049 
€ 3 -0.126 0.042 Price 
€ 6 -1.855 0.043 
31.1% 
25% of friends -1.558 0.055 
50% of friends 0.107 0.034 Network Popularity 
75% of friends 1.451 0.055 
24.7% 
Low -0.489 0.056 
Medium 0.225 0.039 Customizability 
High 0.264 0.058 
11.5% 
All-Or-Friends-Only -0.410 0.071 
Group-By-Group -0.030 0.057 Privacy Control 
Friend-By-Friend 0.440 0.066 
13.9% 
None 1.042 0.054 
Only demographics 0.213 0.037 Information Use by OSN Provider 
All -1.255 0.057 
18.7% 
 
From Table 4 we observe that the total change in final utility from “3 Euros” to a free network implies a change of 
2.107/3=0.702 units of final utility per Euro. Correspondingly, we calculate the final utility change per Euro for a 
change from “6 Euros” to “3 Euros” with 1.730/3=0.577 units. We thereby obtain an upper and a lower bound for 
the utility change per Euro. These bounds can then be used to calculate the Euro equivalent of a change in the levels 
of the other attributes considered in our study (Table 4, columns “Euro value of change“). For example, a change 
from a network with 25% of the friends to one with 50% of the friends is worth the equivalent of between 2.372 
Euros and 2.888 Euros per month. Changing network popularity from 50% to 75% is worth between 1.914 and 
2.331 Euros. Similarly, users would pay about 1 Euro per month for a change from a network with low 
customizability to one with medium customizability, whereas on average additional high customizability is worth 
less than 10 additional Cents. Our results show that users are ready to pay between 0.669 and 0.815 Euro for the 
possibility to control access to their information on a Friend-By-Friend basis as opposed to a Group-By-Group basis. 
For the possibility to limit the use of their information from “all info” to “only demographic info” users would pay 
between 2.091 and 2.546 Euros. Finally, for an additional change to “no info” they would pay an additional 1.180 to 
1.437 Euros. Assuming that a network of the size of StudiVZ (6 million members (StudiVZ 2009b), were using only 
demographic information to personalize advertising, it could earn between € 85.0 and € 103.4 a year (Euro value of 
change x 6 million members x 12 months) by declaring that it is not going to use any information for personalized 
advertising. Of course, this amount has to be reduced by the corresponding loss in personalized advertising revenue. 
Nevertheless, this size of potential income is impressive. For example Facebook, a network of much bigger size 
which places higher emphasis on personalization and user targeting, was able to generate only $150 million in 
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revenue in 2007 (Schonfeld 2008). Overall, these results show that OSN providers can capitalize on user 
preferences. It is important to note, however, that there might be systematic differences between various user sub-
groups within our sample. Understanding these differences might lead OSN providers to derive relevant inferences 
about the structure of user preferences in various sub-groups and hence optimize its offerings. 
Table 4. Utility Change and  Euro Value of Change 
Attribute Name Level Change Utility Change 
P-value on 
Equality 
(t-test) 
Euro Equivalent of Level 
Changes  
(Bound 1 – Bound 2) 
Free  € 3 -2.107 0.000  
Price 
€ 3  € 6 -1.730 0.000  
25%   50% of friends 1.665 0.000 -2.372 – -2.888 Network 
Popularity 50%   75% of friends 1.344 0.000 -1.914 – -2.331 
low  medium 0.715 0.000 -1.018 – -1.239 
Customizability 
medium  high 0.039 0.637 -0.056 – -0.068 
All-Or-Friends-Only  Group-
By-Group 0.380 0.001 -0.540 – -0.658 
Privacy Control 
Group-By-Group  Friend-By-
Friend 0.470 0.000 -0.669 – -0.815 
none  only demographics  -0.829 0.000 1.180 – 1.437 Information 
Use only demographics  all info -1.468 0.000 2.091 – 2.546 
Cluster Analysis of Final Utilities 
In the next step, we conducted a Hierarchical Agglomerative Cluster Analysis on the respondents’ individual final 
utilities in order to determine groups of people with similar utility patterns. The Ward’s linkage we applied forms 
groups by evaluating the distances between clusters on the basis of an analysis of variance (ANOVA) approach: 
Starting from as many clusters as there are observations in the sample, at each clustering step the algorithm 
minimizes the sum of squares of the two clusters which are merged. From the resulting dendrogram we concluded 
that OSN users in our study can be divided into 3 major clusters with 49 (29.1%), 63 (37.5%) and 56 (33.3%) users 
in each cluster, respectively. Table 5 shows the corresponding relative importances (RI) and Table 6 reflects 
differences in the utility changes across clusters.  
Table 5. Relative Importances (RI) by Cluster 
 Relative Importances P-values 
 Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 
 
F 
t-test 
Cluster 1/2 
t-test 
Cluster 2/3 
t-test 
Cluster 1/3 
Price 37.5% 26.5% 30.7% 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 
Network Popularity 27.3% 28.7% 18.0% 0.000 0.483 0.000 0.000 
Customizability 12.9% 11.5% 10.4% 0.242 0.370 0.369 0.096 
Privacy Control 12.3% 16.1% 12.7% 0.012 0.006 0.022 0.776 
Information Use 9.9% 17.1% 28.2% 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
From Table 5 we can derive that participants in cluster 1 place particular weight on network price (RI=37.5%). 
Table 6 shows that these users are particularly adverse to a change in price from Free to € 3. High network 
popularity also plays an important role in the decision of users in cluster 1 to choose an OSN (RI=27.3%). 
Moreover, this group cares the least about the use of their information by the OSN provider (RI=9.9%). Offering 
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these users not to use their information for personalized advertising is by far not enough to make them pay for OSN 
services: Their aggregated drop in utility between “none info is used” and “all info is used” is more than 2 times 
lower than their utility decrease when price is changed from Free to € 3. In its essence, this group seems to uphold 
the traditional opinion that OSNs should be offered to users for free. Users in this cluster also seem not ready to 
invest their time and effort to deal with an increasing complexity of the privacy settings and view them rather as 
hindering than useful. In contrast to other groups, users in cluster 1 consider changes in privacy control from All-Or-
Friends-Only to Group-By-Group as negative (see Table 6). For participants in cluster 1, even customizability was 
more important (RI=12.9%) than availability of privacy controls (RI=12.3%) or use of their information by the OSN 
provider (RI=9.9%). Based on these characteristics we call this cluster “Unconcerned Socializers”. In their core, 
they are oriented to extract a maximum interaction value from the network at the lowest cost and without accounting 
for long-term privacy risks. The fact that 29.1% of the respondents in our sample upheld this set of views regarding 
their privacy on OSNs shows that the share of people unconcerned about their privacy on OSNs is slightly higher 
than it was found in other contexts. For example, 23% were ‘unconcerned’ about their online privacy in a study 
conducted by Jensen et al. (2005) and only 20.51% belong to the “information sellers” cluster identified by Hann et 
al. (2007) for the US respondents.     
Table 6. Utility Change by Cluster 
 Utility change by clusters P-value  
Level change of the attribute Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 F-test 
t-test 
Cluster 1/2 
t-test 
Cluster 2/3 
t-test 
Cluster 1/3 
Price 
Free  € 3 -2.419 -1.868 -2.101 0.023 0.006 0.220 0.103 
€ 3  € 6 -1.683 -1.765 -1.731 0.882 0.618 0.846 0.782 
Free  € 6 -4.102 -3.633 -3.833 0.061 0.022 0.320 0.127 
Network Popularity 
25%   50% of friends 1.663 2.089 1.191 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.006 
50%   75% of friends 1.292 1.790 0.888 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.016 
25%   75% of friends 2.954 3.879 2.079 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Customizeability 
low  medium 0.700 0.875 0.548 0.203 0.355 0.075 0.425 
medium  high 0.036ns -0.207ns 0.319 0.015 0.268 0.004 0.156 
low  high 0.736 0.667 0.867 0.706 0.809 0.419 0.620 
Privacy Control 
All-Or-Friends-Only  
Group-By-Group -0.648 0.839 0.762 0.000 0.000 0.754 0.000 
Group-By-Group  Friend-
By-Friend 0.200ns 0.955 0.161ns 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.872 
All-Or-Friends-Only  
Friend-By-Friend -0.449 1.794 0.923 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 
Information Use 
none  only demographics -0.273 -0.794 -1.354 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 
only demographics  all info -0.688 -1.497 -2.119 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
none  all info -0.961 -2.291 -3.473 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
ns: part-worth was not significant. 
Cluster 2 is made up of users who place much more value than members of the two other clusters on the ability to 
control accessibility of the information they provide by using privacy settings (RI=16.1%). Table 6 demonstrates 
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that while for clusters 1 and 3 the utility change in privacy control from Group-By-Group to Friend-By-Friend is 
insignificant, for users in cluster 2 it is significant. This shows that users belonging to Group 2 are ready to make 
significant trade-offs to gain more refined control. Users belonging to cluster 2 also look for a particularly large 
network (RI of network popularity is 28.7%). Table 6 also reflects a particular sensitivity of this group to changes in 
network popularity. Furthermore, in contrast to the other groups, price of the network is of less importance for group 
2 (RI=26.5%). Based on these findings, we call this cluster “Control-conscious Socializers”. 
Finally, users in cluster 3 are – compared to users in the other two clusters – very concerned about their privacy: the 
way how their information is used by the OSN provider is particularly important for them (RI=28.2%). As Table 6 
shows, all clusters demonstrate a drop in utility when the use of their information increases. However, for users in 
cluster 3 the utility drop for a change from “no info is used” to “only demographic information is used” is twice as 
high as for cluster 2 and five times higher than for cluster 1. In fact, people in cluster 3 would rather accept a higher 
price and especially a smaller network if, in turn, their information is not used. Indeed, network popularity 
(RI=18%) is not as important for this cluster as for the two other ones:  Table 6 reflects only a very small utility 
increase when network popularity grows from 50% to 75%. Summarizing these results, we call this group “Privacy-
Concerned”. The fact that 33.3% of our respondents were part of the “Privacy-Concerned” category is in line with 
the findings from Jensen et al. (2005), who find that 34% of the respondents in his sample belonged to the group of 
people strongly concerned about their privacy – “Fundamentalists”. However, based on conjoint analysis, Hann et 
al. (2007) assign 71.79% of US respondents to a “privacy guardians” cluster. Even though the share of this segment 
significantly exceeds the share of people in our “Privacy-Concerned” category, the total share of “Control-conscious 
Socializers” and “Privacy-Concerned”, two groups with special privacy preferences identified in our study, 
comprises 70.8%, which is comparable to the results by Hann et al. (2007). 
As described in the “Survey Design: Complementary Part” subsection, in addition to completing the conjoint part, 
participants were asked to answer a set of survey questions measuring various constructs as presented in Table 2. 
The answers to these questions were averaged to form an index for each construct. At the next step, for each 
construct index, we compared means over the three different clusters using an F-test on the equality of means. 
Where there was evidence that the means between the clusters differed, we additionally conducted t-tests on pair-
wise comparison. Column “Significant pair-wise comparisons across clusters” of Table 7 shows for which clusters 
the means were significantly different from each other.  
We find that in cluster 1 – “Unconcerned Socializers”, who tend to be less concerned about OSN-related privacy 
issues – the share of men is the highest. This is in line with Sheehan (1999), who shows that women are more 
concerned about secondary usage of their information. On average, “Unconcerned Socializers” demonstrate a 
significantly higher level of trust in legal assurances, online companies and have the lowest scores on the Privacy 
Attitudes scale. This shows that these users tend to have stronger beliefs that their privacy is ultimately protected by 
law and hence they do not have to pay to protect their privacy – a risk already taken care of by policy-makers. And 
even if laws are not strong enough, these users trust that online companies are honest, predictable and consistent 
regarding the usage of the information they provide. In fact, Pavlou (2003) shows that trust plays a central role in 
reducing individual risk perceptions. Finally, “Unconcerned Socializers” show significantly less privacy concern on 
the Privacy Segmentation questions (Harris Interactive 2003).  
In cluster 2 “Control-conscious Socializers”, the share of women is significantly higher than both in cluster 1 and in 
the overall sample. This finding reveals that women are more likely to be interested in additional privacy controls on 
OSNs, which is a major characteristic of cluster 2. This is surprising, as men were previously found to have a higher 
desire for control than women, even though this difference was not confirmed in later studies (Burger and Solano 
1994). On the other hand, this result may be reflective for the fact that women tend to disclose more on OSNs, by 
posting more photos or leaving more self-descriptive information (Kolek and Saunders 2008) and, hence, may need 
more control to protect themselves from the prying eyes of the unknown others. Supporting this argument, users in 
cluster 2 have the highest disclosure and OSN participation rates (although the difference between clusters 1 and 2 is 
insignificant). In addition, in contrast to female users, men tend to use OSNs to get to know new people (Tufekci, 
2008b), which often implies leaving their profile information visible to others (Lampe et al. 2007). Confirming this 
logic, Tufekci (2008a) finds that men are more likely to leave their profile open on MySpace. Further, female users 
seem to be more appreciative of the network popularity, which is an important characteristic of cluster 2. Indeed, 
multiple research findings have confirmed a greater value women attach to the benefits of keeping in touch and 
social connection (e.g. Joinson 2008) 
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The share of women in cluster 3 “Privacy-Concerned” does not differ significantly from the overall sample. 
“Privacy-Concerned” users show less agreement with the distributive justice argument – that it is fair to use their 
information in exchange for the free networking services – in comparison to “Unconcerned Socializers”. Users in 
this cluster tend to reveal significantly less information and also participate less on OSNs. Hence, existing privacy 
concerns seem to be indeed negatively related to user participation and self-disclosure. Taking into account that 
33.3% of the users in our study belong to this group, this finding is relevant for OSN providers. It shows that if 
privacy concerns of this group are not addressed, these users might gradually minimize their OSN activities.  
Interestingly, there is no significant difference in the declared privacy attitude between clusters 2 and 3. However, as 
our previous analysis shows, users in these two groups tend to address their privacy concern in two different ways. 
“Control-conscious Socializers” rely on privacy settings, whereas “Privacy-Concerned” prefer contractual 
agreements specifying how their information can be used. Furthermore, the clusters do not differ with regard to the 
privacy-related past experience of the users. Possibly, media coverage of privacy risks on OSCs is strong enough to 
make users learn from the mistakes of others: So that it makes no difference whether or not user privacy has actually 
been abused in the past. In addition, we find no difference between users across clusters with regard to the attention 
they pay to online advertising: on average all groups slightly agree with statements like: “I don’t pay attention to 
banners displayed on the websites”. Even though all three groups tend to equally “not notice” online advertising, 
“Privacy-Concerned” users show a slightly negative and “Unconcerned Socializers” a slightly positive attitude 
towards personalization. This is in line with the results of Wolin and Korgaonkar (2003), who find that males, 
predominating our cluster 1 “Unconcerned Socializers”, tend to have more favorable attitudes towards online 
advertising when compared to magazine, newspaper or radio channels. 
Table 7: Description of the Three Clusters in Terms of Additional Variables 
Cluster 
Cluster 1: 
“Unconcerned 
Socializers” 
Cluster 2: 
“Control-
conscious 
Socializers” 
Cluster 3 
“Privacy-
Concerned” 
Overall 
Sample 
P-value 
(“H0: Means 
of the 3 
clusters are 
equal”) 
Significant  
(at 5 %) 
pair-wise 
comparisons 
across 
clusters 
Gender: Share of women 45.7% 75.8% 64.2%  63.3% 0.006*** 1-2 
Participation 5.592 5.608 4.786 5.329 0.021** 2-3; 1-3 
Self-Disclosure: Amount  4.235 4.371 3.336 3.986 <0.001*** 2-3; 1-3 
Legal Trust 4.048 3.455 3.190 3.540 0.010*** 1-2; 1-3 
Trust in Online Companies 3.724 3.429 3.205 3.440 0.074* 1-3 
Distributive Justice 4.293 3.989 3.542 3.929 0.069* 1-3 
Attention to Online 
Advertising (values reversed) 3.626 3.726 3.685 3.683 0.928  
Attitude Personalized 
Advertising 4.381 4.339 3.815 4.177 0.064* 2-3 
Past Experience 2.750 2.902 3.101 2.924 0.317  
Privacy Attitude 3.918 4.487 4.673 4.383 <0.001*** 1-2; 1-3 
*Significant at 10%, ** Significant at 5%, *** Significant at 1% 
Detailed Analysis of Clusters – Euro Values 
We now turn to the managerial interpretations of our study. Table 8 presents the Euro-values of level changes in the 
attributes for the 3 different clusters. These values were calculated in the same way as was described in the 
“Analysis of Conjoint Results” subsection of our study for the overall sample. We find that “Control-conscious 
Socializers” are ready to pay between € 1.360 and € 1.656 per month for more refined privacy settings (Group-By-
Group  Friend-By-Friend), which makes it € 16.32 and € 19.87 per year. Taking into account that 37.5% of users 
belong to this group, a network as big as StudiVZ could earn between additional € 36.8 and € 44.7 million (6 million 
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members x 37.5% x € 16.32 or € 19.87) by offering a corresponding type of premium accounts to this specific 
group. Furthermore, “Privacy-Concerned” users (33.3%) are ready to pay on average between € 23.1 and € 28.2 
(1.928 – 2.348 x 12) per year to ensure that their demographic information is not used for personalized advertising. 
They are followed by “Control-conscious Socializers”, who are ready to pay between € 13.6 and € 16.5 (1.130 – 
1.376 x 12) per year for this. “Unconcerned Socializers” are ready to pay only a fraction – between € 4.7 and € 5.7 
(0.389 – 0.474 x 12) a year – to prevent the OSN provider from using their demographic information. Our analysis 
shows that from a commercial point of view, the OSN provider can capitalize the most on the users belonging to the 
“Control-conscious Socializers” group. Indeed, not only are these users ready to pay for enhanced privacy settings, 
but they are also ready to pay significantly large amounts to ensure that their information is not used. For example, if 
a network like StudiVZ offers a premium account with enhanced privacy controls and no demographic information 
used, it will be able to charge “Control-conscious Socializers” at least € 29.92 (€ 16.32 + € 13.6) a year. Another 
“cheaper” premium account can specifically target the “Privacy-Concerned” users, with “just” no demographic 
information being used at a price of € 23.1 a year. Even though a detailed analysis of possible tariffing goes beyond 
the scope of this paper, the interested reader can build an impression on how OSN providers can meet user privacy 
concerns and at the same time ensure a sustainable revenue influx.  
Table 8 Utility Change per Euro and Euro Equivalent of Level Changes (Bound 1 – Bound 2) 
 
Cluster 1 
“Unconcerned 
Socializers” 
Cluster 2 
“Control-
conscious 
Socializers” 
Cluster 3 
“Privacy-
Concerned” 
Overall Sample 
Utility change per Euro                      
(Bound 1 – Bound 2) 0.806 – 0.561 0.623 – 0.588 0.700 – 0.577 0.702 – 0.577 
 
Level change Euro equivalent of level changes (Bound 1 – Bound 2) 
 Network Popularity  
25%   50% of friends -2.368 – -2.883 -2.976 – -3.623 -1.696 – -2.065 -2.372 – -2.888 
50%   75% of friends -1.840 – -2.240 -2.549 – -3.104 -1.264 – -1.540 -1.914 – -2.331 
Customizability  
low  medium -0.996 – -1.213 -1.246 – -1.517 -0.780 – -0.950 -1.018 – -1.239 
medium  high -0.051 – -0.063 0.295 – 0.360 -0.454 – -0.553 -0.056 – -0.068 
 Privacy Control  
All-Or-Friends-Only  Group-By-Group 0.923 – 1.124 -1.194 – -1.455 -1.086 – -1.322 -0.540 – -0.658 
Group-By-Group  Friend-By-Friend -0.284 – -0.346 -1.360 – -1.656 -0.229 – -0.279 -0.669 – -0.815 
Information Use  
none  only demographics 0.389 – 0.474 1.130 – 1.376 1.928 – 2.348 1.180 – 1.437 
only demographics  all info 0.980 – 1.193 2.132 – 2.596 3.018 – 3.675 2.091 – 2.546 
Discussion and Concluding Remarks  
Our study is the first attempt to empirically investigate the factors behind the choice of an OSN using a conjoint 
approach. We find that price and network popularity play the most important role in the user decision to join an 
OSN, with users showing a particular aversion to a shift from a free network to a paid one. This can be partially due 
to the fact that traditionally OSNs have been offered for free. Furthermore, in contrast to a widespread opinion 
concerning carelessness of OSN users with regard to their privacy, a factor Information Use by OSN Provider 
emerged as third in importance. Our results also show that enhanced privacy controls are appreciated by many users. 
These users are not afraid of complexity with regard to privacy settings and are ready to take an effort to deal with 
complexities of privacy design in exchange for more control over personal information. Finally, customizability 
emerged as the least relevant factor, with users not making a distinction between “high” vs. “medium 
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customizability” in terms of their utility. A particular advantage of conjoint analysis is that it allows to derive 
founded inferences concerning the value respondents attach to particular attribute levels. This approach 
differentiates our study from other survey-based attempts to evaluate user privacy concerns (e.g. Acquisti and Gross 
2006). Our results show that on average a user would be ready to pay between € 14.14 and € 17.24 a year (12 
months x € 1.180 – € 1.437) if the OSN provider refrained from using his or her demographic information for 
personalized advertising. For a network with a size of StudiVZ (6 million members (StudiVZ 2009b), this would 
mean an annual revenue of € 85.0 and € 103.4 – a sum comparable to StudiVZ market value of approximately € 100 
million (Cubrilovic 2008).  
Acknowledging that there might be systematic differences between users within our sample, we conducted a cluster 
analysis in order to determine groups of users with similar utility patterns. Knowledge about the existence of these 
clusters will allow OSN providers to design their offerings to target the specific needs of these groups (e.g. various 
premium accounts). We find three distinct clusters of OSN users: “Unconcerned Socializers”, “Control-conscious 
Socializers” and “Privacy-Concerned” users. We show that importance attached to network popularity, price as well 
as preferences regarding one’s own privacy underlie the differences across these clusters.  
“Unconcerned Socializers”, a male-dominated group, are willing to get the maximum communication value from 
the network at the lowest cost possible. Our complimentary analysis has revealed that users belonging to this group 
may rely on the legal system and therefore not see a reason to pay for their privacy. This finding is disturbing, taking 
into account the low level of user knowledge with regard to privacy regulation and OSN privacy policy (Acquisti 
and Gross 2006). Generally, the fact that the share of “Unconcerned Socializers” identified in our study is higher 
than the share of “Unconcerned” found in comparable surveys (e.g. Jensen et al. 2005; Hann et al. 2007) should be 
alarming for policy-makers and other stakeholders. It shows that users might be significantly underestimating the 
risks related to their participation on OSNs. In this regard, the role of policy-makers emerges as particularly 
important, as major effort is needed to ensure that users make rational decisions in the face of existing trade-
offs.“Control-conscious Socializers” is a female-dominated group of users who are looking for a particularly large 
network and who place high value on the ability to control accessibility of the information they provide. Translating 
the value these users attach to their privacy into monetary terms, we find that a network of the size of StudiVZ could 
earn additionally between € 36.8 and € 44.7 million by offering more refined privacy settings specifically to this 
group. Finally, “Privacy-Concerned” users are very concerned about how their information is used by the OSN 
provider. On average, these users participate significantly less in OSN activities than users of the other two groups. 
OSN providers should pay a particular attention to this group: If their privacy concerns are not addressed, these 
users might minimize their activities on the platform. On the other hand, taking into account the high value these 
users attach to their privacy, the OSN provider could charge these users between € 23.1 and € 28.2 per year in 
exchange for not using their demographic information for personalized advertising. This way, the interests of both 
groups, OSN users and OSN provider, would be met.  
Limitations and Further Research 
Our study is subject to several limitations. First, a large part of our respondents were students. Taking into account 
the fact that the demographics of OSNs are constantly changing (insidefacebook.com 2009), further research should 
validate our findings with other population groups. In addition, most respondents in our sample have European 
origin, which limits the scope of our study to European user base. Krasnova and Veltri (2010), however, show that 
German and US users exhibit different attitudes when it comes to their level of privacy concerns on OSNs, trust in 
the OSN provider and legal assurances. Furthermore, differences in income may also have an impact on how much 
users are ready to pay for their privacy. Hence, validating our study results in other countries, including those with 
lower average income levels, e.g. China and India, represents a worthwhile venue for future research. Finally, the 
results of every conjoint analysis are highly dependent on the choice of the attributes and their respective levels. 
Therefore we are aware of possible disagreement on the choices we made. Addressing this argument we stress that 
all our decisions were based on the extensive literature review combined with pre-study interviews and careful 
pretesting of the conjoint design. 
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